Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

State of Utah v. Mary Vatsis : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black; Counsel for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Vatsis, No. 8989 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3254

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Case No. 8989

IN THE SUPRE,ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FILED
Respondent,

-vs.MARY VATSIS,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ······'·············································

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................

3

STATEMENT OF POINTS..........................................................

4

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................

4

POINT I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY ...........................

4

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ................................................. 13
CON,CLUSION .................................................................................. 15

AUTHORI'TIES CITED
CASES
State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P. 294 (1927) .................... 11
State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589 (1932) ...................... 11
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 .P. 628 (1920) ......................10, 11
State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P. 2d 949................................ 14
State v. Morris, 85 Utah 10, 38 P. 2d 1097 (1934) .................... 11
State v. Timmerman, 88 Utah 481, 55 P. 2d 1320 (1936) ........ 10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 8989

:MARY VAT SIS,

Appella!nt.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

(The parties will be referred to as they appeared in
the trial court. Tr. refers to the pages of the Reporter's
Transcript. R. refers to that portion of the Record consisting of papers filed in the Clerk's office.)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of
conviction (R. 76) entered upon a jury's verdict of guilty
of the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses
(R. 59).
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The case went to trial on an information (R. 15)
which was amended during the course of the trial (R. 57,
Tr. 134) and in which it was alleged that defendant obtained a check from the Commercial Credit Corporation
by "representing and selling'' to Commercial Credit
Corp. "a fraudulent Conditional Sales Contract" purportedly entered into between Ann Troulis and the V & H
Motor Company "which Conditional Sales Contract was
fraudulent and forged."
The State filed a Bill of Particulars (R. 20) in which
it specified the conduct of defendant Mary Vatsis relied
upon to establish the defense:
"Mary Vatsis signed the name 'Ann Troulis'
to the contract without authority and with intent
to aid her husband and co-defendant to obtain
money by false pretences."
Mary V atsis was charged jointly with her husband.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the action
against him because of the absolute lack of evidence tending in any way to establish his guilt of the offense. The
State, in detailing his conduct in the Bill of Particulars
(R. 20) stated as follows:
"He was a principal in the execution of a
fraudulent contract. He acknowledged that one
Ann Troulis purchased a car frmn hin1, which was,
in fact, false and which fraudulent signature he
was aware of."
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Commercial Credit Corporation was in the business
of purchasing Conditional Sales Contracts on automobiles (Tr. 11). The V & H Motor Company was an automobile dealership in Price, Utah. It sold its contracts to
Commercial Credit. The office manager of Commercial
Credit testified in dealing with that concern he dealt with
both the defendant and her husband John (Tr. 11). Leon
Green, unit manager for Commercial Credit, testified
he ordinarily dealt with John and very seldom with defendant Mary (Tr. 44). As a matter of fact the V & H
Motor Company was John V atsis doing business under
that name. The defendant only worked there.
The contracts would be submitted by the dealer to
the Commercial Credit Corporation and it, in turn, would
investigate the purchaser's credit, etc., and would then
issue a check to the dealer (Tr. 11). John or defendant
Mary would either mail the contract in or bring it in
personally (Tr. 12). The charge here is founded upon a
Conditional Sales Contract on a 1956 Buick automobile
(Exhibit 1). The contract was dated March 9, 1957 and
the V & H Motor Company by John V atsis appears therein as the Seller and Ann Troulis as the Buyer (Tr. 13).
Commercial Credit purchased the contract on March
12, 1957, and paid the sum of $2,175.00 for it (Tr. 13).
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The check issued was in the amount of $6,700.00 and included other contracts (Tr.15, Exhibit 3). The check was
endorsed and paid (Tr.15). The check was given to John
Vatsis (Tr. 129).
This same Buick was floor planned by V & H Motor
Company with Commercial Credit Corporation on AprjJ
4, 1957 (Tr. 21).
As indicated, the State's case is based upon the proposition that the contract was forged. The only two persons who could testify concerning this matter were Ann
Troulis and Mary V atsis. Ann Troulis did not testify
that she did not authorize 1fary Vatsis to sign her name
to the contract. Mary V atsis testified very definitely that
authority was given to her to sign the name of Ann
Troulis to the contract (Tr. 146, 156). We will discuss
this phase of the testimony under the Argument in the
brief.
STATE1fENT OF POINTS
POINT L
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY.
.
POINT II.
THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO.3.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY.
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Inasmuch as the charge was necessarily based upon
the forgery of the contr.act we will discuss the absolute
lack of any evidence to show forgery.
Ann Troulis testified that on or about March 8, 1957,
she discussed with Mary Vatsis the purchase of an automoblie (Tr. 57). Included in this discussion was whether
or not Miss Troulis could afford an automobile. She
testified that she indicated to defendant to go
ahead and take whatever steps were necessary to effect
the financing of the automobile. She left it up to the defendant to take care of the details ('Tr. 57). During this
conversation they talked about making out a contract for
Miss Troulis to get an automobile. Within a short period
of time thereafter Miss Troulis called defendant on the
phone to inform her that she couldn't afford to pay for
the automobile and the deep freeze and therefore she
wanted to cancel the contract which had been made up
for the purchase of the car (Tr. 57, 58). She definitely testified that after the contract had been made she
changed her mind and told defendant to cancel it ( Tr. 58).
After the foregoing was disclosed on cross examination, the prosecutor took over and was given permission
to cross examine Miss Troulis on the grounds she was a
hostile witness. She testified as follows:

"Q. Didn't you authorize Mary Vatsis to sign your
signature to that contract~
A.

I can't answer yes or no to that.
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Q. You know whether you did or not, don't you1
Miss Troulis ~
A. I can't remember. I maybe did.

Q. Do you think you did~
A. I may have.

Q. Do you think you authorized her to sign your
name to that contract~
A. I may have." (Tr. 59, 60)
Apparently there is an error in the transcript because the testimony referred to in the preliminary hearing undoubtedly was that Miss Troulis did not tell defendant she could use her name, but, in any event, she
explained the reason for any change in testimony as
follows:
"A. I answered 'no' because I was afraid that if
I answered in any other way I would be implicated in this and because I have more or
less been-well, I have been bull-dozed by fl
few people so far as this contract and things
like that are concerned." (Tr. 60, 61)
Miss Troulis was told that if she did not sign a statement implicating defendant she would end up paying for
the car ('Tr. 62). Under cross exanrination of the prosecutor she testified:
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"Q. You may have authorized her to sign your
signature to a contract~
A. I may have. I am not saying I did and I am
not saying I didn't." (Tr. 63)
She then testified :
"A. I am implying that from my last testimony I
said, 'No, I didn't give her permission to use
my name,' and I have thought about it and I
was afraid - I haven't been mixed up in
anything like this before - and I came up
here with the thought I would be mixed up in
getting a car I didn't know anything about
and I just felt my only answer was to say
'no' because I was afraid and I had been
threatened." (Tr. 63)
She then testified concerning authorization to sign
the contract:

"Q. You didn't authorize her to use your signature, did you~
A. I may have. I talked to her a lot of times
about my getting a car.

Q. What did you authorize her to use your signature for, signing checks, buyfng a car or what~
A. I guess on a contract.

Q. For

what~

A. A car, I was planning on buying a car." (Tr.
63, 64)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
Further testimony of Miss Troulis reveals the following:

"Q. Here is the point I am getting at : You told
Mr. Hansen you called Mrs. V atsis up and
told her to cancel the contract. You tell me
what contract you told her to cancel.
A.

The one she was supposed to have made out.

Q. Which
A.

one~

The contract we talked about when she was
at my house.

Q. Which

contract~

A. For a car.
Q. What

car~

A. Whichever one I tried out. I don't know."
(Tr. 67, 68)
Concerning cancellation she testified:

"Q.

How did you know what you were cancellingT

A.

I knew because we had talked about it and
I just felt to 1nyself I didn't want to try paying for son1ething else until I paid off the
freezer so I called and told her that."

She then testified:

"Q. But you didn't buy any other car or sign any
other contracts nor did you authorize anyone
to sign a contract for you. did you~
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A.

I don't know whether I did or not. I may have.

Q.

Your testimony in December would be more
reliable than it is today~

A.

No, because since December I have thought
and thought about it and it's bothered me because when I came up here-and I was really
afraid because that was after I had been more
or less threatened by Commercial Credit and
I felt any other explanation I tried to make
other than 'yes' or 'no,' I would get stuck with
a Buick." (Tr. 68)

In her testimony Miss Troulis refused to testify that
her name had been signed to the contract in question
without her authority. Inasmuch as the charge was based
on the supposed misrepresentation resulting from passing a forged contract, this ended the State's case.
Defendant recalled this sale and testified she talked
with Ann Troulis at the Sooklaris home on the evening
of March 8 (Tr. 146). They discussed the purchase of
the 1956 Buick. Defendant did not have any contract
forms with her and she explained to Ann how the contract
could be executed and "when I left I was under the impression that she was buying the car and that I had her
authority to sign her name." She also testified:

"Q. Is it your position that you sold the automobile, a 1956 Buick automobile, to Ann Troulis ~
A.

That is right.
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Q. It was an actual, genuine

sale~

A. Yes.

Q. And she authorized you to sign her name to
the contract~
A. Yes." (Tr. 156)
Miss Troulis later cancelled this contract and on
March 13, defendant called Commercial Credit and talked
to Leon Green. She told him not to process the contract
because Ann had told her that she had better pay off the
deep freeze and not a car. V & H Motor Company had
already received the check from Commercial Credit at
this time (Tr. 146, 147).

State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 P. 628, (1920) and
State v. T~mmerman, 88 Utah 481, 55 P. 2d 1320 (1936)
have set forth the elements necessary to make out the
crime of obtaining money by false pretenses. They are (1)
a false or fraudulent representation (2) made knowing it
to be such (3) with intent to cheat or defraud the person
to whom the representation was made. ( ±) An actual
fraud must have to be perpetrated in the sense that something of value was obtained and the victim lost something
of value. ( 5) The representation must have induced the
owner to part with his property in the sense that the owner parted with his property in reliance upon the truth
of the representation.
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By the .Amended Information as limited by the BiU
of Particulars, it was necessary that the State establish
that the contract with Ann Troulis was forged. We submit the foregoing evidence will not support a finding of
forgery and hence, defendant's Motion for Directed V erdict should have been granted.
This failure on the part of the State's proof, also
eliminates other elements of this offense. If there was no
forgery, the contract assigned to defendant was enforceable against Miss Troulis. In this respect Commercial
Credit obtained that which it bargained for and hence,
an essential element was not present which required a
directed verdict. State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P.
294 (1927) ; State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589
(1932); State v. ~lVlorris, 85 Utah 10, 38 P.2d 1097 (1934).
The fact that a certificate of title was not delivered
to Commercial Credit was of no importance here because
in the ordinary course of events that would not be delivered for 30 to 60 days and the Commercial Credit did not
expect title when the money was paid for the contract,
but expected it to be delivered in the future (Tr. 23).
The sale of this contract could only imply a promise to
deliver a certificate of title in the future. Failure to deliver the title as promised could only result in a breach
of contract and upon it could not be based a criminal complaint for fraud. Such a promise is not a misrepresentation of a material existing fact. ~ee St,ate v. H owd, 55
Utah 527, 188 P. 628 (1920).
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In the H owd case, supra, the defendant sold the
cattle of one Foy to Adams and Consley, and gave to
Foy an insufficient funds check. The court stated concerning this transaction which is analagous to the one
presented in the case at bar:
"The testimony is absolutely clear that no
actual fraud was intended or perpetrated in this
state. All that can be gathered from the record
of the testimony is to the effect that defendant
purchased Foy's cattle at Thompsons, Utah, that
he there paid to Foy a part of the purchase price,
and promised to pay the balance upon the arrival
of the cattle at Grand Junction, Colo., a promise
to be performed in the future. This was a very
ordinary and perfectly legitimate transaction, and
one that would not legally justify any inference
of an intention to cheat or defraud Mr. Foy out
of his property. Let it be conceded, although it is
not shown from the testimony, that the defendant
did not intend to pay for the cattle upon their
arrival at Grand Junction, yet his representation
that he would pay was purely promissory in character, and therefore may not be held as a fraudulent representation or false pretense in the legal
meaning or acceptance of the terms."
Also, in its case at bar, the testilnony will not support
a finding that there was an~~ intent on behalf of defendant
to cheat or defraud anyone.
In the Bill of Particulars as heretofore set forth, it
appears that the position of the State was that defendant
Mary Vatsis aided and abetted John Yatsis in the perpetration of the crhue of obtaining n1oney by false pre-
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tenses. A Motion to Dismiss at the close of the State's
case was granted as far as John Vatsis is concerned and
this should also have resulted in the now defendant Mary
Vatsis being dismissed, or certainly a directed verdict
granted.
There is absolutely no evidence that Mary Vatsis
ever, at any time, presented this contract or received
any money from Commercial Credit.
We submit that under the evidence produced by the
State it constituted error for the trial court to deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict and, therefore,
this case should be reversed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO.3.

Instruction No. 3 set forth the elements which, if the
State proved them, would justify the jury in returning
a verdict of guilty.
The fundamental error in this instruction is that it
departed from the charge as contained in the Amended
Information and the Bill of Particulars. No place in this
instruction was it required that the State prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the contract in question was forged.
It uses the words "bona fide sale" and "fictitious contract." There is no evidence which would permit the
presentation of any such issue to the jury.
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The instruction is general in that it uses only the
foregoing language and there is no definition of its terms.
What does the word "fictitious" mean~ In the ordinary sense of the word in criminal law, it is used to describe a situation where person uses a name which is not
his own or that of any known person; hence, the check
or obligation is known as fictitious. No such situation
existed in the case at bar. State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478,
136 P.2d 949.
The use of the words "bona fide sale" is also confusing. If this contract involved in this case was not forged,
then it was enforceable against Ann Troulis and if it was
enforceable against Ann Troulis this would not constitute
the offense of obtaining money by false pretences because ·Commercial Credit would have received a contract
which was enforceable and, therefore, would have obtained that for which it bargained, as indicated by the cases
cited under Point I herein.
This instruction is indicative of the fact that the trial
court must have felt the State had utterly failed to produce evidence which would support a finding of forgery
and, therefore, sought to change the charge.
This instruction is also bad because there is no evidence which would support a finding that the contract
was either fictitious or did not constitute a bona fide
sale. We have heretofore indicated why it is that it is
not fictitious. If this contract were enforceable it would
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of necessity be a bona fide sale and whether or not it is
enforceable goes back to the old proposition of whether
or not a forgery in fact, was committed.
Subparagraph 1 of this instruction requires a finding
that Mary V atsis presented to Commercial Credit the
conditional sales contract signed by Ann Troulis. There
is no evidence that Mary Vatsis ever presented this conditional sales contract to the Commercial Credit or that
she had anything to do with the transaction with Commercial Credit.
We submit that this departure from the charge contained in the .Amended Information and Bill of Particulars constituted prejudicial error, it was further prejudicial because the evidence did not support the giving of
such instruction.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit the State failed to introduce
evidence which would permit a jury to find the contract
in question was forged. We further submit the trial
court was aware of this deficiency in the State's evidence
and in order to make a presentable case, departed from
the charge set forth in the Amended Information and
the Bill of Particulars which required forgery, and gave
the jury an instruction in the field of fictitious contracts
and bona fide sales. We submit that in departing thusly
the court committed prejudicial error to the rights of
the defendant in this case.
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We respectfully pray that the court reverse the verdict and judgment of ~conviction and order that a directed verdict in favor of the defendant be entered, or in the
event this is not done, that the case be reversed for a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
By

BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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